Introduction
Insufficient attention is given to the concept of the retail format and to the insights that it can offer to the study of retail history. The term "format" is frequently used in a simple manner in order to identify the broad retail store type of interest. Only occasionally are definitions of particular formats contested, perhaps most notable being the case of the department store. 1 One implication of this lack of attention is 3 that variations within broad format types are inadequately addressed. Consequently, we know insufficient detail about the development and management of formats by particular retail firms. Another is that the impact of format change for wider, interfirm relations and processes, such as those occurring in the supply chain, are overlooked. This study provides a detailed evaluation of one retailer's development of the supermarket format. It does so not in an attempt to identify the first or purest form of the format. 2 Instead the paper argues that one characteristic of early supermarket retailing was its diversity. The analysis is based upon a detailed reading of the archive of the London Co-operative Society (hereafter LCS) supported by a review of the trade and popular press. The paper draws upon discussions in the literature of contemporary retail management as well as those in retail history.
In addition to highlighting the case for more attention to be given to the concept of the format, the paper also contributes more broadly to our understanding of co-operative society retailing during the post-war period (in this case roughly [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] . Recent historical research has explored general trends in early supermarket adoption in the co-operative movement. 3 The analysis of format development at the society level represents a valuable addition to this, revealing as it does key retail management issues at the local, trading level. It provides an opportunity for more meaningful firm-level comparisons. By concentrating on events during the period 1960 to 1965 the paper explores the adoption of supermarket format innovation at a time when its significance had become generally established. It provides a useful contrast to studies that concentrate on the emergence of these innovations. 4 The LCS was formed and developed through the amalgamation of a number of London and regional co-operative societies extending its area of influence beyond the capital into Middlesex, Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey. 5 It became the largest of the 4 UK co-operative societies with a membership of 1.25 million people. 6 The archive, held at the Bishopsgate Institute, London, holds a large collection of material covering the range of the society's activities, including political and educational aspects as well as those of retail trading. It is the latter that is the focus here, although care is taken to avoid artificially separating the retail business of the society from its wider organisational underpinnings as the latter also inform our understanding. That part of the LCS archive related to the retail trades is itself considerable in scope. It includes numerous minute books and papers from the management committee and subcommittees across the range of the society's retail trade including chemists and department stores as well as the food trades that are the focus here. Management of the LCS's retail operations was based upon a structure of an elected management committee (or board), supporting management subcommittees and a professional management executive. Of the subcommittees "Number 2" is of most interest in this study, its remit including the society's food trades. The study focuses largely on the period 1960-1965. The starting date is broadly co-incident with the emergence of supermarket development activities at the LCS. By 1965 the LCS was trading from three purpose-developed supermarkets, and the first signs of their profitability were being recorded its financial analyses.
The remainder of the paper is structured into four sections. In the next section the notion of the retail format is discussed and related to debates surrounding the growth of supermarket retailing in Britain. Following this, the paper provides a brief review of the development of self-service retailing and the supermarket format by the LCS. The main section of the paper assesses the society's deliberations over and engagement with key aspects of the supermarket format. Discussion is organised around so-called "offering" and "know-how" format characteristics of the 5 supermarket. The paper ends by highlighting the key conclusions drawn from the LCS case.
The supermarket as a retail format
Retail formats are complex combinations of visible and hidden components. This helps to explain why it can be difficult for the outside observer to identify new retail formats with precision, develop clear definitions of even the main types and gain consensus for these definitions. This is certainly the case for supermarkets which emerged in Britain during the 1950s. A basic trade definition of the supermarket was in circulation by the early 1960s that considered 'a supermarket is a store of not less than 2, 000 sq. ft. sales area, with three or more checkouts and operated mainly on self-service, whose range of merchandise comprises all food groups, including fresh meat and fresh fruit and vegetables, plus basic household requisites (i.e. soaps and cleaning materials).' 7 However, in the earliest post-war years of self-service retailing what constituted a supermarket was less clearly articulated even among interested parties. One reason is because much early self-service retailing and shopping took place through converted grocery outlets of varied size and make up; many being far smaller and carrying a much narrower product assortment than what eventually came to be recognised as supermarkets. Comparisons with supermarket retailing in the US also led to ambiguities. 8 The typical supermarket of 1950s America was some 18 000 square feet (1620 m 2 ) in size, with the largest stocking in excess of 10 000 articles. 9 The first supermarkets developed in Britain were much smaller in size, a fact reflected in the 2 000 sq. ft. minimum sales area adopted as a benchmark in early attempts to 6 define the format. As late as 1967 it was suggested that the typical supermarket in Britain was only some 4 000 sq. ft. in size.
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Trade definitions such as the one presented above consider only those components of a format that are visible at the outlet, in this case store size, shopping environment and service type and product assortment. No attention is given to more hidden factors or to those which occur away from the outlet, such as the systems supporting the stores and the operating firm's organisational structure and management culture. This is problematic because the nature of firms' format variations, and their success or otherwise in operating formats, are also influenced by such systems, structures and cultures.
Lewison highlights the importance of the format to retail competition:
'Competitive advantages are realized by creating a retail format that is tailored to specific needs of a carefully determined segment of the total market. Retail formats (the means) encompass the total mix of operating and merchandising tactics and practices used by the retail firm to distinguish and differentiate itself from other competing retail formats.' 11 Formats can be seen as 'combinations of technologies'
and retailing involves the bundling of these technologies in ways considered most appropriate for the marketplace. 12 Viewing them in this way can help us to understand format variation. In a more detailed consideration of the nature of the format, Goldman views it as consisting of two parts: the offering (external) and the know-how (internal). 13 The first includes elements such as product assortment, shopping environment, service, location and price. The second part, the know-how, he considers to determine a retailer's operational strength and strategic direction. It consists of the retail technology dimension (the systems, methods, procedures and techniques the retailer uses) and the retail culture (including the repertoire of 7 concepts, norms, rules, practices and experiences). 14 In contrast to some recent interpretations that have restricted attention to the elements visible to the consumer, this paper adopts Goldman's fuller conceptualisation. 15 In doing so it is possible to differentiate better and to account for variations within as well as between broad format types. Hence the various supermarket type formats appearing can be better understood, avoiding their development being too simply characterised as that of one homogenous form. This is important as a close reading of the history of self-service retailing in post-war Britain reveals the very different offers put before the consumer.
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The LCS and the "modernization" of retailing Recent studies have contributed to our understanding of the development of selfservice retailing and supermarket outlets in post-war Britain and their impact on consumer practices. 17 The innovative role of the co-operative movement is revealed, with the LCS's experimental conversion of its Romford grocery branch to self-service in 1942 widely remarked upon. 18 By 1950 there were some 50 or so supermarkets operating in Britain, and the co-operative movement was at the vanguard of their development. 19 Yet by 1961, when the number of supermarkets had swollen to an estimated 572, 20 the dominance of the co-operative movement was being eroded by the private multiples. 21 Less attention has been given to the co-operative's place in this latter phase of supermarket development. suggested that the co-operative lacked the variety of bargains that the multiple could offer. 24 The co-operatives response to The People article rehearsed arguments of propagandist attacks on democratic socialists and sought to rebut many of the claims made. 25 However the movement knew that overall there was much to be done. After all, less than four years previously the Co-operative Independent Commission had voiced concern that 'if we ask what is the "image" of a Co-operative shop in the public mind, the answer will not be a supermarket or a new department store.' 26 In the case of the LCS the stiff retail competition provided by the grocery multiples' supermarkets in London and the need for rapid modernisation across its food retail store network was beyond denial. It became one focus of an increasingly bitter struggle for the overall control of the LCS. 27 One protagonist in the struggle, future halls from a total of 409 grocery stores across the society. 33 By 1961 the number of self-service stores in the society's portfolio had grown to 120 with an additional 24 of the larger self-service food halls. 34 These store numbers meant that the LCS had more self-service stores than many other large co-operative societies, such as the Royal
Arsenal and Birmingham societies, yet they represented a much lower proportion of the overall store network. 35 Similarly, the LCS was not too dissimilar in terms of total number of stores operating on self-service basis to its private multiple rivals Victor
Value (191) and Tesco (211), but again these competitors had far fewer counterservice stores. 36 It was somewhat belatedly in 1961 that the society set down a more comprehensive programme for self-service retailing. Importantly this included discussions of plans for nine proposed supermarket development schemes. 37 The first offering element for consideration is "Location". Supermarket developments during the study period were typically located in or close to town centre locations and loci of suburban shoppers. Dealing with external considerations such as town planning restrictions could slow development, as in the case of the LCS's Loughton supermarket. 42 Acquiring much-sought-after shop sites on or near to the 13 rapidly emerging municipal housing developments was also a challenge, although in the case of the London County Council area at least the co-operative was given reasonable access to new sites. 43 The society's existing infrastructure of smaller grocery, butcher's and fruit and vegetable shops in many ways represented a hindrance to the modernisation of the food trades through supermarket operations.
First, many were too small for conversion to supermarket formats containing a range of non-food as well as food items, or even to larger self-service food retailing through food halls. 44 Second, as discussed below, others were in locations considered unsuitable for redevelopment with such formats. 45 As a consequence the society faced potentially significant exit sunk costs in seeking to dispose of their small counterservice units and adopt new trading methods in larger supermarket outlets. Faced with market rental costs described by the society's grocery department manager as being 'terrificly high', 46 financing the acquisition of new sites suitable for supermarket development was difficult. So too was meeting the cost of redeveloping existing sites for supermarket trading. Thanks to its extensive property portfolio the society could point to an advantage over some of the less well capitalised rivals emerging in the market, 47 but like the movement as whole it was bound by its practice of distributing capital surplus, particularly though the dividend. As Sparks notes in his review of post-war consumer co-operation, the result of this approach has been that 'in a situation where locations have changed, and the price of developing retail outlets has … rocketed, many societies have found themselves under capitalised.' 48 The LCS was no different in this regard. 49 Perhaps unsurprisingly the LCS's first supermarket was developed on a site converted from use as a small drapery store. The development of the LCS's second supermarket at Loughton, which opened to much fanfare in 1962, illustrates the challenges faced in opening innovative new supermarket stores. The store was extremely large by standards of the day, with the 28 165 sq ft site providing 15 250 sq feet of selling space. 54 The new store, it was reported, was expected to draw trade from a thickly populated area between Leytonstone in the South and Harlow in the North, with the Debden housing estate being a short bus ride away. 55 However, within a year serious concerns were being 15 raised about the performance of the store. With sales reportedly below those needed for profitability, executives began to view the store as being too large for its 'comparatively thinly surrounding population'. 56 As a consequence plans were made for the alternative use of 40 per cent of the store's space for heavy furnishing goods and for a pharmacy to be brought in, both elements under separate control from the supermarket. 57 The store was reported as being profitable for the first time in the society's balance sheet for the year ending January 1966.
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"Shopping Environment and Service" is the second offering element for discussion. Remarking upon the opening of the LCS's first self-service store in 1942, the then food trades manager recalled that the society was keen to find out four things:
would the customer pick up their own goods; could the LCS get higher through put from the staff; was it possible to use less experienced assistants; and could pilfering be guarded against? 59 By the 1960s the retail management challenges of self-service trading in supermarkets were more substantial as firms competed to offer the shopper more innovations. A research report by J. Walter Thompson noted of the "housewife" on a shopping trip 'Inside the supermarket she is in a new and exciting, although to some people a confusing, atmosphere. She may shop to music or relayed sales messages; and she is confronted with new products, daily bargains, unusual form and colour combinations in packaging and increasingly sophisticated methods of display.' 60 In this environment of product and service innovation and spectacle even the newly converted self-service outlets of the LCS were the subject of some critical scrutiny.
BBDO, for example, reported that among co-operative members and nonmembers alike more thought the society's stores 'less up to date' than competitors' stores than those considering 'them more up to date'. This, it was suggested, may have reflected the view that the co-operative movement as a whole had an old fashioned 'cloth cap' look to it. 61 Whatever the cause this perception was problematic because shopping environment and service were obviously important to shoppers in their choice of store. The society's newer self service stores were generally considered an improvement over its more traditional counter service outlets, but some shoppers thought they compared poorly to the competitors' large supermarkets, being less roomy and less well organised. As one non LCS member is reported as saying of their self-service stores 'As they're not as big as the supermarkets they don't seem to carry much stock -or they give that impression as they're smaller.' Another stated 'supermarkets are much better because they're more roomy. Understandably the society made much of its new 3 000 square foot supermarket. But the reviewer from the trade press Grocers' Gazette was far from overawed by the new development. The store, it was argued, was comparatively small and it was noted that the LCS already had larger food halls in operation. Aisles were criticised as being too narrow, leading to congestion, and the departmental layout was not typical of the latest design. Commenting on advertisement features placed in local press supplements by the society, the author for the Gazette could find little evidence to support claims of this development being the result of an 'adventurous LCS…' or representing 'shopping revolutions'. 65 It was the LCS's opening of what was reported to be the capital's largest supermarket at Loughton three months later that signalled their ambition to use the modern format to its fullest potential. Here reviews were more positive, seemingly impressed by its 150 foot covered frontage and sheer scale, and noting innovations in gondola arrangement and the attempt to present an 'open market atmosphere'. 66 Complimentary reports suggested that having parked the pram at the large pram park, the shopper could push her two tier trolley around the vast store to the sound of piped music, observing the deep price cuts that abound and all the while confident that the store has a commissionaire to 'keep an eye on junior'. 67 We now turn to the issue of "Product Assortment"; the third of Goldman's offering components. As the Financial Times remarked, 'While the supermarkets are busily working to acquire the knowledge [of how to sell non-food items], the Co-ops individually possess long experience over the whole range of consumer goods'. 68 This was certainly true. Societies also enjoyed the supply chain infrastructure provided by the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS). While the full potential of the relationship between the movement's production, wholesale and retail parts was far from realised 69 , co-operatives were notionally in a strong position to meet the increasingly wide assortment of products being offered in the newest and largest of its rivals' supermarkets. The LCS's purpose-designed supermarkets seemingly met many of the criteria. The opening of the Becontree store revealed a selection of towels, toasters, electric fires, toys, china and glass for sale. Its manager was keen to boast that as a result of the society's dry goods department he could get some non-food goods he wanted into store within 24 hours. 72 The society's third supermarket, opened in Walthamstow in September 1963, was arranged on an approximately 90/10 spilt (food to non-food) with non-foods being focussed around easily carried clothing items. 73 The opening of the Loughton supermarket took the LCS's attempts to combine food and non-food trading under one supermarket roof to another level. Approximately half of the 15 000 sq ft trading hall was devoted to foodstuffs and the remainder given over to non-foods. 74 In addition to the food department with large deep freeze and delicatessen sections, advertisements for the store remarked on its extensive range of non-food goods including a fashion department, linen and kitchenware, soft furnishings, electrical goods, health and beauty, record bar and gifts and toys. 75 Yet it is also instructive to consider the subsequent sales performance of the various supermarket departments. Grocery unsurprisingly dominated sales in all three supermarkets, but the performance reported for "dry goods" was at best modest. In the two smaller supermarkets at Becontree and Walthamstow dry goods were typically far outsold in value by tobacco products. 76 Like other co-operative societies the LCS pursued a strategy of developing larger self-service food halls, both stand alone and within its department stores. 77 Combining two or more of the main food trades, the society's food halls provided the shopper with a wider product assortment than many of its smaller self-service grocery
outlets. Yet the combination of previously separate food trades units posed merchandising and other problems. During a period of accelerated conversions in 1962 a deputation of the society's fruit and vegetable managers met with the Food Trades Manager to raise concerns over the integration of previously separate units into food halls. Included among these were what they considered the frequent lack of adequate product preparation space, shoppers' lack of acceptance of pre-packaged products that were crucial to self-service operations and their dislike of having 'to wander around the rest of the Food Hall' to reach the exit, and the high sales targets placed on the newly integrated units. The deputation suggested that it was perhaps better if only the unprofitable fruit and vegetable operations be combined into food halls. Acknowledging some of the difficulties and limitations in current hall design, the society's Food Trades Manager was nonetheless driven to remark upon the apparent "departmentalism" he perceived in some of the discussions. 78 Typical early food halls lacked a significant non-food component.
Consequently the food hall concept seemed increasingly moribund as the full supermarket format evolved among competitors and the LCS sought to introduce an increasing range of non-foods into the halls. 79 By 1963 the society was forced to 20 accept the far greater popular appeal of the term "supermarket", and chose to adopt it for all stores over 2 000 sq feet and to promote them to the public as such. 80 The fourth offering component "Price" represented an increasingly important element of the supermarket. Surveys of shoppers' attitudes to the supermarket undertaken during the early 1960s stressed the advantages they offered in terms of providing a one stop shop, a hygienic shopping environment and a time saving shopping experience. 81 Lower prices in supermarkets were less strongly reported as a particular advantage, perhaps in part due to interviewees wishing to provide socially desirable answers. Only 13 per cent of J. Walter Thompson's survey of almost 1400
women shoppers reported lower prices as a particular advantage of the supermarket format. 82 One woman's response was 'You have to watch prices, though. In the supermarket they're not always cut-price'. 83 This was certainly true in some cases, but price competition had increasingly become a part of the supermarket's impact. Resale Price Maintenance had virtually broken down in grocery by 1959, and its demise had started somewhat earlier in the highly competitive London market. 84 In 1958 the LCS had seen the need to launch a "price-attraction" policy, selling fast moving grocery products below normal prices in response to the price cutting of the supermarkets. 85 However, sustaining this price competition was problematic due to the greater costs incurred by the LCS's food retail operations. Whilst the LCS believed that their supermarket rivals operated on costs of 2s 6d in the £ or less, comparable figures for the LCS were reported as 3s 2d
(grocery), 4s 6d (butchery) and 4s 10d (fruit and vegetables). particularly the supermarket retailers. 89 Conspicuous among these was the adoption of an aggressive and flexible pricing policy, with regional and area co-ordinators empowered to make price cuts and selected discounts to meet the competition of private multiples in their area on a shop by shop basis. 90 In October 1962 the society launched an "instant dividend" at its self-service stores and a guaranteed 6d dividend at other shops. 91 However, the instant dividend was restricted to larger self-service stores by 1963. 92 Its reduction and ultimate demise came amid considerable acrimony between rival groups on the society's management board, including contested allegations as to members' commitment to the on-going modernisation of the retail trades and dispute over the society's actual trading performance. 93 It was into this highly price competitive London market that the LCS opened its first supermarkets, competing against large private multiples able to sustain low margin trading. The society sought to heavily promote the price competitiveness of each of its supermarkets of course. Its paper Citizen stressed that the Loughton supermarket was about providing value for shoppers and noted the deep price cuts available on a number of lines. 94 Similarly, in an allusion to the street markets operating close to the Walthamstow supermarket, the supermarket's manager stressed to readers of the local press that shoppers at his store could enjoy hygienic food retailing together with 'barrow boy prices' without the discomfort of street trading. 95 Yet this need for heavy discounting and price competition provides some explanation for the fact that all of the LCS supermarkets recorded net losses during their initial years of trading. As the society's Chief Accountant noted in his report for the year ending 1964, despite rising sales 'to date …the supermarket venture has been a complete failure; the trade achieved has been inadequate in view of the low gross profit rate, the wage cost and the high overheads following the heavy capital cost'. 96 Yet the report went on to suggest that the LCS was not alone in finding difficulties with supermarket profitability in 1963 and argued that across the trade there was evidence of the impact of 'low-price selling' on supermarket profitability. Based on this, a somewhat brighter outlook of reduced loss-leading activities and gently upward margins was forecast for the middle years of the 1960s.
The final offering component for consideration is "Marketing and Promotion".
In an attempt to promote a new image and the aggressive pricing policies of the LCS, BBDO's public relations firm PDA was engaged to handle a major LCS advertising and publicity campaign. 97 Their UK head concluded 'We'll go out and knock spots of John Cohen and his supermarket chain.' 98 Television and press advertisements were designed to push the new message of the LCS under the general slogan 'Buy better for less at the LCS'. An advertisement in the Evening Standard proclaimed 'Check this list carefully. It shows every London housewife how much she saves … at LCS selfservice shops. Our computers work it out at 10.7208%'. 99 As we have seen, this was supported by promotion of the price competitiveness of each of the society's supermarkets at the time of their opening.
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Among other store outputs emphasis was placed on the convenience of having food and non-food items under one roof in the supermarket. This was intended to reflect emerging evidence that women food shoppers favoured the supermarket as it could offer 'all you want in one shop'. 100 Unsurprisingly the new, very large supermarket at Loughton was strongly promoted as a 'shopping centre for the whole family'. 101 The Co-operative News announced 'It's everything for everybody in London's giant supermarket'. 102 Yet, self-service shopping and the supermarket format provided challenges as well as opportunities to the food shopper during the 1960s. For housewives seeking to meet their responsibilities for proficient shopping switching to these new formats could create anxiety and required the nurturing of new skills. 103 Retailers sought to adopt the leitmotiv "modern" to reassure consumers. The The financial press drew broad comparisons between the private multiples, lauded for their 'computer controlled stock systems and expert management' and the systems and processes of non-modernising co-operative societies. 107 However, manufacturers maintained a strong position in the distribution chain and played an increasingly important role through rising direct to store delivery. Many major retailers' distributions systems were in need of modernization. 108 J. Sainsbury was reported to openly acknowledge the dated nature of its distribution infrastructure compared to that of its shops. 109 The company set about investing in new distribution centres during the early 1960s; the first opened in Basingstoke, Hampshire in 1964.
It was against this backdrop that in 1963 the Board of the CWS approached societies about the introduction of its plan for regional distribution centres aimed to introduce the "newest technologies" to the distribution system and reduce the costly duplication of co-operative society warehouse infrastructure. 110 The LCS was critical of what it saw as a delay by the CWS in coming to terms with the need for revised warehouse and distribution systems. Instead it suggested that the society should proceed with its own warehouse project, 111 the significance of supply chain modernisation having been highlighted in an internal grocery department enquiry of 1963. This enquiry reported that the society's warehousing capacity was out of proportion with the demands placed upon it and set down plans to deal with this.
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Falling departmental sales and rising direct to store delivery from private manufacturers meant that the society's warehouses handled only 50 per cent of the society's retail trade. 113 In relation to their organisation the report continued '(the) 25 present warehouse arrangements are not designed as a slave to the shops' or laid out with regard to the general need of the branches. As a consequence, the stock holding areas of many branches were reported to be congested and inadequate for the increased amount of pre-packaging occurring in store.
The poorly organised nature of the warehouses in relation to shop needs was particularly problematic as self-service retailing necessitated the pre-packaging of most foodstuffs. Whilst non-perishable foods came to the stores pre-packaged from manufacturers and wholesalers, many perishables continued to be packaged in store and in the case of fresh meat retailing this necessitated investment in specialised cutting and preparation rooms. 114 Management of the LCS grocery department considered that the society should be mirroring sector trends toward more prepackaging taking place in central warehouses, but special provision was made in its new supermarkets for extensive food preparation at the store. Whilst the trading area of the society's first purpose-developed supermarket at Becontree was comparatively small at only 3 000 square feet, the store nonetheless provided an almost similar amount of above-store warehousing space and a purpose-designed ground level packaging room. 115 Similarly, the later Walthamstow supermarket had a sales area of 4 700 square feet supported by a further 2 300 square feet of storage, preparation and refrigeration space. 116 The much larger Loughton supermarket had far more extensive food preparation and pre-packaging areas, starting with its integrated butchery cutting room that customers of its meat department could observe directly from the trading floor. 117 Behind this lay almost 6500 sq ft of warehousing and a 2650 sq feet loading bay providing a 'streamlined… supply operation.' Nonetheless their effects should not be underestimated in terms of their ability to drawing focus away from the pressing needs for improved retail management.
Rapid growth of the private multiples' share of the food market focussed commentator attention on the differences in structure and organisational culture between them and the co-operative societies. The issue was widely aired. Alongside inflammatory press descriptions of 'pig-headed committees that just talk, talk, talk while the superstores steal their trade…' 120 came rather more considered assessments of the deficiencies of management in many co-operative societies in comparison to that of the multiples.
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The LCS's retail management structure increasingly came under attack from 'modernisers' from within and without. BBDO considered that to successfully rejuvenate the food trades required a change of management. Indeed it asserted that poor management was the main problem of the LCS's food business; with new management needed that is 'good enough to run a £30m business…' 122 BBDO concluded further that such management needed the input of outside management counselling. Similarly, in a notorious attack on the traditional management structure of the LCS following a society visit to the Konsum co-operative in Stockholm, LCS President Stonehouse remarked in the pages of The Grocer 'due to historic circumstances, the LCS control structure has grown into a rather complex bureaucracy which tends to centralise detailed trading decisions, blunt initiative in the executive ranks and delay action'. He continued, 'In practice many officials prefer to shelter behind committees rather than taking personal responsibility. The system encourages timidity and inaction…' 123 Such comments need to be read in the context of the ongoing bitter dispute and division among members of the LCS management board.
Nevertheless, the challenge of combining co-operative business efficiency with the ethos of democratic control was the subject of more wide ranging enquiry at the time. 124 Planning for the development of supermarket trading itself required revisions to management structures, with the existing sub-committee organisation considered impractical for their management. Accordingly, the society's Chief Officer and
Secretary set down plans for a "Supermarket Division". Merchandise sold in the supermarkets would be obtained through the existing buying organisation of the food, dry goods and pharmacy departments but the division would operate independent of these, recruiting its own staff and organising its own promotion and selling. It was agreed that during the early phases of supermarket development the Assistant Chief
Officer and Secretary would have control and responsibility for these operations, thus avoiding the need for the various sub-committees to be continuously consulted as the business progressed.
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The possibility for tension between commercial and ideological interests could also be manifest in the reactions of members and employees to the modernisation of retailing through the adoption of large self-service units and supermarkets. 126 For some members of the movement the closure of smaller, economically inefficient yet convenient society branches in local neighbourhoods in order to save costs, or to make way for a proposed supermarket, was emblematic of the dangers of ill-managed 28 change and sat uncomfortably with their interpretation of the movement's purpose. 127 The closure of the LCS branch in Walthamstow, nearby its recently opened supermarket, saw a petition of protest from the Walthamstow Women's Guild to the Co-operative Union demanding '… that it is kept open as a service to the members especially the old and loyal ones'. 128 The issue of shop closures was also raised in the bitter row among members of the management committee. Stiffened resistance to
Stonehouse's presidency reportedly led one member of the management committee to draw parallels with the impact of Beeching on the railways and to argue that the society should not continue closing branches without considering the social consequences. 129 The retailing practices employed in the society's supermarkets were also the subject of debate and disappointment for some members and their representatives. Eleven months after the opening of the Loughton supermarket LCS officials met with a deputation from Debden Loughton Co-operative Party to discuss their concerns over the trading methods at the store. These included worries that the range of CWS goods sold was too small, a related objection to the space given over to promotion of private manufactured products and unhappiness that non-members shopping at the store enjoyed the same benefits as members.
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Unsurprisingly there were diverse opinions across the movement, as well as within societies, as to the means by which to best meet the challenges posed by the private multiples' supermarkets. The proposals of the LCS to compete through an instant dividend drew a rather critical consideration in the official journal of the cooperative movement Co-operative News. Such a policy, it was argued, diluted the distinctive features of the co-operative and reduced its social purpose thus rendering it no different than any private multiple. 131 As Fulop noted, the dividend had an emotional hold over co-operators at this time, its primacy remaining official co- 
Conclusions
The late 1950s and early 1960s were clearly a time of great challenge and difficulty for the LCS's food retailing operations. The growing emphasis on supermarket development by the private multiples trading in the London area put considerable pressure on the society's place as a major player in the capital's food retail market.
These supermarket retailers were working on downwardly revised margins and costs in an environment of intensified competition for trade and labour. It was into this arena that the LCS embarked upon its development of supermarket retailing operations. The study offers us an insight into a period of learning for the society about the supermarket format and its potential. Much of this learning was forced upon the LCS. From the late 1950s onwards the society launched numerous price reduction schemes designed to meet the threat posed by the multiples' supermarkets as it 30 eventually hurried to develop its own such outlets. By 1963 the society made the fundamental decision to use the term "supermarket" for all of its larger stores in an attempt to attract customers desirous of the outputs they perceived such new store types could offer.
Another manifestation of this period of learning about the supermarket innovation is the diversity of large self-service stores initially operated by the society.
The earliest experiences of such operations came through the society's food halls. As non-foods were introduced into these halls the larger of these became effectively supermarkets, being very much comparable to the society's two smaller, purposedeveloped supermarkets. Turning to the supermarkets, in store size and offer the contrast between the society's first supermarket opened at Becontree and its second at Loughton was marked. Trade press reviews portrayed Becontree as a small, unexceptional supermarket and one that failed to live up to the society's boasts of 'shopping revolutions'. The Loughton store opened only three months later revealed the real ambitions of the LCS to benefit from the new large format approach. The history of supermarket development was not characterised by the roll out of a homogenous store type; instead it was a "messy" process including much trial and error. Nonetheless, the significance going forward of developing larger supermarkets was clear. 135 The use of a detailed conceptualisation of the format incorporating offering and know-how components allows for a more comprehensive consideration of the LCS management's engagement with the supermarket format. It can also provide some explanation for variations between the supermarket operations of private multiples, independents and co-operative societies. The main focus here has been on the co-operative society aspect. In relation to the offering components, it is clear that 31 the development of supermarkets provided new challenges in terms of the planning of store locations, the design of store environments and their provision of service, pricing strategy and wider marketing and promotion. In each of these domains supermarket operations required changes from the practices adopted by the LCS for both counter-service operations and more recently established smaller self-service stores.
Know-how components of the format were more hidden to the customer but were increasingly fundamental to the successful operation of supermarkets. In relation to systems and procedures, this paper has placed emphasis on the pressures on supply chain systems resulting from the development of larger, higher turnover stores. A particular requirement during the study period was for more extensive food storage and preparation areas. The paper has also revealed the significance of an appreciation of the "retail culture" of the co-operative movement as a whole, and the LCS in particular, to our understanding of the supermarket developments that occurred. The often uneasy combination of enterprise and social goals that characterise the movement was further uncovered by the challenges of retail modernisation during the study period. The desire to maintain democratic principles of control proved very problematic as practiced by the LCS during the study period. Of course the management boards of many private multiples were themselves the source of unproductive friction, but the in-fighting between rival management groups at the LCS appears singularly bitter and certainly represented a distraction from the pressing business at hand. The movement's practices and norms in the distribution of capital, both imposed and self-imposed, meant it faced particular difficulties in financing the heavily capital intensive new store developments required. When the new stores were opened the LCS, like other societies, could face criticism and dissatisfaction from 32 employees and shopper members alike. Again there is no suggestion that private multiples were immune from such criticism, but the particular nature of the cooperative movement and its effective ownership by members meant that it drove further to the heart of retail societies deliberations on how to best meet the diverse demands placed upon them going forward.
